This paper accounts for the intercontinental elaboration of French mathematician Laurent Schwartz's theory of distributions in the years immediately following World War II by tracing how mathematicians explained the theory to each other, advanced new interpretations, and reconciled existing ones. Situating distributions in mathematicians' changing contexts of funding, travel, and publication, especially in connection with the postwar reconstruction of international science, I argue that wordplay and suggestive comparisons-often termed ''abuses of language''-helped tie communities of scholars together across disparate geographies and fields of study. Material limits and linguistic ambiguity, here, offered important resources for asserting *Dartmouth College, 6107 Carson Hall, Hanover, NH 03755, USA.
THEORY ON THE MOVE
No theory is born universal, and even the most monumental breakthroughs start small. In the winter months of 1944-1945, as the Second World War waned in Europe, a young French mathematician named Laurent Schwartz set out to rewrite the basic principles of mathematical analysis with what he soon termed his ''theory of distributions.'' 1 In July 1946, Schwartz lectured for four hours on his ''great progress'' with the theory to an approving audience of his countrymen, an eccentric collective of radical reformers who published under the pseudonym Nicolas Bourbaki.
2 A year later, Schwartz confided to his wife his unease with the ''excessive success'' his theory had found in Copenhagen, Denmark: ''all the same, [the theory] is not Jesus Christ, and the compliments of the three Magi from the world over unsettle me a little; wasn't he later crucified?'' Fields Medal at the International Congress of Mathematicians in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where his theory was compared to ''Descartes' development of the analytic geometry'' and his earliest paper on distributions was hailed as ''one of the classical mathematical papers of our times. '' 4 In 1954, an elder statesman of Argentine mathematics all but rolled his eyes at the ''enthusiasts of Lorenzo Schwartz's theory,'' a group that included many of his continent's leading young mathematicians. 5 By the end his theory's first decade, Schwartz had traveled tens of thousands of miles, crisscrossing continents, and his theory had traveled even farther. Scholars studied and taught variations of the theory in Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa, across the Western and Eastern Blocs, and in many parts of the non-aligned world. Schwartz went on to be a leading figure in French and international mathematics, and distributions became a foundational element of postwar scholarship in several broad areas of mathematics and theoretical physics.
This kind of itinerary, for a young and previously little-known mathematician or his newborn theory, would have been unthinkable before 1945. The speed and, especially, the intercontinental geographical span over which mathematicians learned of and took to the theory defy comparisons to prewar precedents in mathematics. 6 After the Second World War, however, mathematicians and their sponsors reshaped the discipline's institutions, practices, problems, and pedagogy. Stories like those of Schwartz and distributions became extreme examples of a normal pattern, rather than startling exceptions. Mathematicians pursued theoretical research in more and farther-flung places, forging and refashioning connections between the discipline's global centers and peripheries.
7 Their discipline's transformed scales depended on newly available means of travel and communication and the new institutional connections they allowed, but also on new ways of studying and understanding mathematics that reached to the very words and principles with which mathematicians articulated their theories. Amidst changing geographies and infrastructures, mathematicians debated the nature of mathematics itself-whether it was unified and structured, adaptable and applied, absolute or arbitrary, organic or artificial. 8 What it meant to do mathematics and the means of doing it transformed in tandem, with manifold consequences for mathematicians' ideas and discipline alike.
This essay asks how mathematicians' means shaped their meanings, and how meanings shaped means. I explain the continent-crossing first decade of the theory of distributions by situating the theory's great variety of meanings and interpretations in mathematicians' shifting rhetorical, institutional, material, and other contexts-that is, in mathematicians' variegated means and conditions for developing and sharing theories. Indeed, I argue that the multiplicity of distributions' meanings was essential for the theory's rapid spread across these contexts. Such multiplicity manifested both in the theory's broad conceptual adaptability and in its rhetorical pliability, with disparate interpretations finding common voice in fruitfully ambiguous formulations. Changing means of scholarly exchange and changing approaches to mathematical argument and understanding allowed scholars spanning vast distances to adopt and reconcile a wide range of interpretations of the theory of distributions: conceptual travel facilitated geographic travel and vice versa. Distributions' scholars cast the theory as a banal trick for applied calculations, a difficult intervention in the recent theory of topological vector spaces, a profound realignment of established methods, a radical departure from familiar concepts, and many things in between. They found common ground through metaphors and wordplay, textbooks and abstracts, rhetoric and representation.
The next section places this central finding about heterogeneity and reconciliation within long-running conversations among historians and sociologists of science regarding expertise, communication, and theoretical knowledge. I then set the scene for Schwartz's intervention in the history of functions and the calculus with a brief introduction to the so-called Heaviside and Dirac functions, which were central in several early accounts of Schwartz's theory. After characterizing Schwartz's first presentation of the theory of distributions, I explain the context and implications of his use of wordplay and attention to language, with particular reference to the reframing of mathematics associated with Bourbaki. The mathematical technique of integration by parts, here, exemplifies Schwartz's approach while furnishing an apt description of the kind of social and intellectual consolidation that this approach allowed. The remaining sections detail how the theory of distributions spread to new geographic and intellectual milieux in terms of the foregoing considerations, in relation to new institutional, geopolitical, and other conditions. I conclude by revisiting the problems of meaning and ambiguity for histories of theoretical knowledge, arguing for the central place of historical actors' ongoing labor of partial integration.
EXPERTISE, EXCHANGE, AND THE PLURALITY OF THEORY
A theory can be many things to many people, but to each of a theory's users and exponents it tends to be, in itself, just one thing. Different theorists with different emphases, framings, priorities, and commitments can agree or disagree, adopt or adapt, understand or misunderstand, all while believing themselves be engaging one and the same theory. This tension between a unitary conception of scientific knowledge and its plural manifestation has been fundamental to the history and sociology of science. Viewed in social context, theories are not just collections of definitive claims, premises, methods, and implications, but also personal and institutional relationships, ways of simultaneously organizing both knowledge and its producers. Often, theories and associated technical systems join together actors across a spectrum of social roles and positions, giving rise to identifiable patterns relating social structure to theoretical understanding. 9 Even actors in comparable social circumstances must reconcile divergent piecemeal understandings, and I have elsewhere argued that this kind of medium-dependent labor is fundamental to both the social and intellectual practice of present-day mathematical research.
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Informed by this work, I take the perspective here that theories are best understood as social systems built around relationships of partial mutual understanding, and theoretical labor is best interpreted in terms of generating and reconciling senses of mutual understanding that underwrite those relationships. I mean this in a strong sense: where used as an analytic term, one may (in principle) read ''theory of distributions'' as ''social system built around relationships of partial mutual understanding of distributions.'' By placing social relationships, rather than conceptual objects, at the center of the analysis, this view of mathematical theories reflects a relativist epistemology of mathematics.
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Since the only empirical basis for establishing mutual comprehension is the social activity it licenses, my historical interpretation of the past's mathematical understandings shall stress how claims about ideas and methods constituted or transformed communities of interaction.
Knowledge of distributions was highly differentiated, ranging from recognition to familiarity to connoisseurship to interactional competence to pedagogical competence to research expertise or virtuosity. Though many found the theory of distributions easier to learn than other theories of comparable reach and novelty, to use distributions in one's research could still require weeks or months of special study on top of years of relevant specialized training. But to appreciate distributions-to ''get a sense'' of the theory-required little more than experience with undergraduate calculus, an experience professional mathematicians could readily take for granted. The theory's adoption depended on communities of mathematicians, physicists, and engineers with substantially different kinds of understanding being able to interact fruitfully in a range of settings and for a variety of purposes. If the theory of distributions appeared as just one thing, it owed this appearance to the vast and circumstance-dependent labor required to see unity in the great diversity of texts and contexts, of knowledges and practices, that came to be associated under its banner.
Historians and sociologists of science may recognize this kind of claim under such familiar rubrics as ''trading zones'' or ''boundary objects. '' 12 Whenever distinct communities converge around common projects, they translate their different interests and understandings by way of entities that can tie the communities together while sustaining different meanings for each. As with diagrams or formulae in physics or finance, the formalisms scholars used to represent distributions succeeded as bridges between communities because their respective users could understand them very differently, while continuing to hold them in common. 13 Moreover, just as some kinds of data, specimens, or apparatus in the natural sciences travel better than others, so too do some loci of representation in theoretical disciplines like mathematics.
14 Here, the established historiography on the transformation of scientific knowledge through textual transmission, translation, and interpretation helps to explain both the pluralization and consolidation of distributions as a theory rooted in polysemic renderings of mathematical phenomena. Distributions' interpretive pliability has haunted both historical discussions of the theory itself and the theory's limited historiography. The history reported here turns on several examples of methods and concepts being identified as distributions in disguise, a stipulation aided by specific linguistic practices discussed below. The first extended study of the history of distributions focused on the massive tangle of conceptual and genealogical relationships among the many ideas and practices that came to be associated with distributions in the theory's early years.
16 For Schwartz's critics, the range of apparently equivalent approaches exogenous to his own was evidence that the theory was merely derivative-consisting of old ideas in new clothing and reflecting differing national or personal styles of mathematics. 17 Schwartz's defenders (including Schwartz himself), conversely, painted the theory's unification of so many exogenous approaches as evidence of its profundity, while bootstrapping a constituency for the theory of distributions by laying claim to those already versed in the other approaches. 18 Recent scholarship has followed the theory between different scholarly communities to draw conclusions about those communities' philosophical values or forms of collective engagement.
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At the same time, both historical actors and historians have tended to treat the theory of distributions as just one thing, albeit one found in many guises. Seeing unity, like recognizing difference, must be understood as the result of situated interpretation. it means to know a theory. The history of distributions hinges on what it means to know the same thing differently across times and places.
FUNCTIONAL DISTINCTIONS
One way-likely the most common one historically-to understand the theory of distributions is as a generalization of two notions fundamental to calculus and mathematical analysis: functions and differentiation. In this respect, Schwartz joined a tradition dating to the first century of Newton's and Leibniz's calculus. 20 By the mid-eighteenth century, Leonhard Euler established a widely followed interpretation of functions as relations between independent and dependent variable quantities, with differentiation producing the rate of change of a dependent variable with respect to a specified independent variable-the function's derivative. 21 Most subsequent interpretations of functions and differentiation followed suit, reinterpreting variables, rates of change, and other terms and concepts accordingly.
History's various interpreters of functions and differentiation dwelled, in particular, on the relative foundational statuses of different forms of representation, ranging from graphs and diagrams to explicit or implicit formulae to different kinds of symbolic expressions of abstract relations. 22 As mathematicians offered new definitions of the central terms of the calculus, this history of adaptation and reinterpretation was itself an important feature of their rhetorical and conceptual interventions: by the nineteenth century, mathematicians recognized the calculus as a subject whose changing fundamental notions manifested the changing state of mathematics itself. Sometimes this history was a measure of mathematicians' progress. predilections of ''incorrigible idealists,'' whose attitude Picard found untenable after the Great War. 24 For most theorists of differential equations since Euler, functions and differentiation presented a persistent dilemma. A perfectly valid (even useful) function might have discontinuities or irregularities, corresponding to rates of change that could be infinite or even indefinable, which created havoc however one considered differentiation. Worse, many such non-differentiable functions were mathematically significant, and indeed often practically useful for specialized calculations. So one had, in effect, to choose between prioritizing, on the one hand, working directly with the functions of interest, or ensuring one's ability to take derivatives unproblematically, on the other. If favoring the potentially non-differentiable functions, one could attempt to work around their irregularities in a piecemeal fashion. If seamless differentiation was more important, one could focus exclusively on smooth functions that lacked troublesome irregularities altogether but somehow approximated the non-differentiable functions. Either way, something was lost.
Promoting his theory, Schwartz paid special attention to one situation where physicists and engineers had, in their own ways, grappled notably with the tradeoff between irregular but supremely useful functions and their rigorously tractable but less immediately useful cousins: their use of the Heaviside and Dirac functions. I shall present them now in a somewhat more didactic mode than I use for mathematical discussions in the rest of this article, where I have attempted to hew as closely as possible to actors' often ambiguous and differentially understood presentations. Here, however, a less historically faithful exegesis shall help illustrate the kinds of interactions among meanings, techniques, and stipulations about rigor and validity that surface in other guises in the ensuing historical discussion.
British electrical engineer Oliver Heaviside's eponymous function seems at first glance about as simple as a function could be. It relates an independent variable (say, x) to a dependent variable (say, y) by giving y the value 0 when x is negative and 1 when x is positive. If you interpret x as time, the Heaviside function can be interpreted to represent flipping a switch at time x ¼ 0, with y ¼ 0 meaning the switch is off and y ¼ 1 meaning the switch is on. On a Cartesian graph, the Heaviside function is a flat line at altitude y ¼ 0 to the left of the y-axis and a flat line at altitude y ¼ 1 to the right, forming a ''step'' shape. Heaviside used this function as a basic element for a method of symbolic operations that many found enormously effective for a wide variety of calculations, but which proved controversial for its lack of adherence to prevailing norms of mathematical rigor. 25 To see the mathematical trouble, consider the Heaviside function's derivative. Almost everywhere, the y value of the function does not change at all, and so the function has a derivative of 0 (meaning a null rate of change). But at the crucial point x ¼ 0, the function jumps infinitely quickly between the values 0 and 1 of the dependent variable y, so has an infinite derivative at this point. Because it represents the rate of change necessary to jump precisely from 0 to 1 in this instant, this function is sometimes called the ''unit impulse.'' This one infinite value made calculations with the Heaviside function's derivative unrigorous, critics held.
Matters were worse for the derivative of the derivative: 0 except at x ¼ 0, and when x ¼ 0 rising infinitely quickly to reach the derivative's infinite value at that point, before falling (with x still 0) infinitely quickly to return to the derivative's subsequent value of 0-that is, the Heaviside function's second derivative when x ¼ 0 was positive infinity and simultaneously but subsequently negative infinity. Corresponding to the first derivative's ''unit impulse,'' this second derivative is sometimes called the ''unit dipole'' or ''unit doublet,'' since its equal and opposite values-if ''values'' can be said to apply here-correspond to precisely the acceleration needed to produce the instantaneous jump from 0 to 1 whose velocity was reflected in the unit impulse.
Some decades after Heaviside debuted his symbolic calculus, Paul Dirac introduced his own symbolic calculus using the Heaviside function and its derivatives. Dirac's calculus furnished an important method for atomic physics but was likewise criticized by some as lacking proper mathematical foundations. He denoted the Heaviside function's derivative with the Greek letter d, and others subsequently referred to d as ''Dirac's function,'' ''Dirac's delta,'' ''the Dirac function,'' or similar terms.
If one insisted on avoiding paradoxical infinities, one could imagine the Heaviside function and its derivatives as the limits of corresponding sequences of functions that were perfectly smooth and hence unproblematically differentiable. In place of the Heaviside function itself, picture an S-shaped curve that replaces the instantaneous leap of the Heaviside function at x ¼ 0 with a smooth take-off when x has merely a very tiny negative value, followed by a rapid (but not infinitely so) rise toward y ¼ 1 and a smooth landing at y ¼ 1 as x reaches a tiny positive value. The derivative then looks something like a very tall bell centered around the y-axis, and the second derivative features two tall bells: one peaking high and to the left of the y-axis and the other, upside-down, dipping low to the right of the y-axis. These pictorial approximations (and a corresponding set of customary equations) represented one response to the function-derivative dilemma, letting one apply derivatives only to bounded and differentiable functions at the cost of a great many more manipulations to access the limiting results of the Heaviside and Dirac calculi.
A more common response to the dilemma, however, involved learning a system of rules and conventions for manipulating the Heaviside, Dirac, and related functions directly using ordinary formalisms for functions and their derivatives. In some circumstances, these functions could be manipulated just like any ordinary non-paradoxical function. In other circumstances, a few principles combined with familiar rules of calculation to dictate how the function could be used. For instance, to compute the integral of the Dirac function, one used the values of its antiderivative (the Heaviside function) and the formula from the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, ignoring that this theorem did not rigorously apply to the Dirac function.
26 In yet other circumstances, users had to learn to rule certain questions or manipulations out of bounds, as treading impermissibly on the functions' paradoxical qualities.
That is, some ways users were accustomed to working with ordinary functions translated easily to these other functions. Some ways translated somewhat, under the appropriate cautions and with some necessary contrivances. Some other ways-such as examining them graphically or computing with point-values-were inapplicable or applied only in rough approximations. Users drew techniques and understandings from their training and aims, recognizing paradox-laden functions as cognate to unproblematic ones in ways specific to the contexts and purposes of their use. Even when using similar symbolic representations for such functions, meanings attributed to them and justifications for their uses could vary. Where an electrical engineer might see an expression as representing an idealized electric potential, a quantum physicist may rationalize a similar expression in terms of wave functions. Similar manipulations could come from distinct rules and trainings. Paradoxes and exceptions, too, were susceptible to different conceptualizations. Even simple examples hid worlds of divergent meaning. In many respects, this kind of conceptual and practical accommodation recalls well-studied developments in the history of numbers. 27 Negative numbers, imaginary and complex numbers, and infinitesimals each owed in part to tentative accommodations between mathematical principles and practical ends. Each raised problems about rigor, generality, and foundational validity that could be grounds for philosophical dispute. Each was defended in some quarters as a useful (if not necessarily grounded) fiction, justified through its utility in calculation. Eventually, new proposals about rigor and foundations proved their worth in their capacity to integrate such once-exotic or exceptional numerical entities as part of a coherent system. So, too, did Schwartz derive his theory's merit (and lay claim to its potential constituencies) from its systematic incorporation of Heaviside and Dirac calculi that had been variously accommodated in other terms. Although many aspects of the story of distributions are specific to their historical times and places, they were not without models and patterns from the past that shaped both directly and indirectly how mathematicians understood distributions. This history rhymes, and its protagonists could hear it.
A THEORY IS BORN
Schwartz first sketched his theory for public consumption in an eighteen-page article in the 1945 annual volume (printed in 1946) of the Annales de l'université de Grenoble, the in-house publication series of the university where Schwartz held his first academic appointment. 28 The article itself, which he later called his ''propaganda tract,'' 29 seems to have circulated mainly in the offprints Schwartz distributed to an ever-growing circle of mathematicians. More significantly, it is the earliest available record of the template for many of Schwartz's initial expositions of the theory of distributions, including his debut lectures on the theory in his January-April 1946 Cours Peccot, a prestigious half-century-old Paris lecture series for young mathematicians organized by the Collège de France, and his July 1946 Bourbaki presentation.
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The article's page-long overture signaled Schwartz's ambitions by beginning with physicists and their calculations, not mathematicians and their proofs. Or rather, with a caricature of physicists as freewheeling artisans of the Dirac calculus, loyal to fruitful calculation but not to mathematical rigor. Though the latter part of his article's title promised ''mathematical and physical applications,'' Schwartz put all of the claimed physical applications in this brief introduction, which centered on the alleged absurdities of the Dirac function and its derivatives. ''Since the introduction of the symbolic calculus,'' Schwartz began, ''physicists have commonly made use of certain notions or certain formulas for which the success is indisputable, while not being mathematically justified.' ' Schwartz described the Heaviside function (without the eponym) and then introduced (under Dirac's name) the key properties of the Dirac function: ''null for x 6 ¼ 0, equal to þ1 for x ¼ 0,'' and with a definite integral of 1 over its whole domain. ''Such an 'abuse of language,''' wrote Schwartz, ''is despite everything incompatible with the habitual notion of function and derivation!'' He announced that his article would summarize a forthcoming monograph (an albatross of a textbook that would take him the next half decade to complete) that ''will provide a complete justification to the preceding language,'' and so ''rehabilitate'' the Dirac formalism for mathematicians and physicists alike.
One should hesitate to take at face value Schwartz's assertion about the Dirac function's faults. To be sure, Schwartz was not alone among mathematicians in declaring the need for a completely rigorous justification of the Dirac function. All the same, physicists, engineers, and even mathematicians had developed a wide range of informal and formal justifications for their Dirac calculi. With approximations, gestures, illustrations, and especially with rules and conventions of symbolic manipulation, these scholars used the Dirac function without being apparently beleaguered by supposed foundational difficulties. The Dirac function's purported lack of mathematical justification despite its usefulness was not a pre-given rationale or state of affairs, but rather something Schwartz had to assert, in part by ruling its many manifest justifications to be non-mathematical or insufficiently rigorous.
The Dirac function's derivatives supplied the template for Schwartz's proposed rehabilitation, both narratively and conceptually. Although the Dirac function was not itself a conventional function, its users could understand it as the derivative of the conventional Heaviside function, which was not differentiable at the critical point x ¼ 0. To justify an unconventional derivative of a conventional function, Schwartz interpreted the Dirac function as a measure, understood as a generalization of functions. Schwartz then portrayed the Dirac function's derivative, which was not rigorously valid as a conventional measure, as a linear functional, presented as a generalization of both measures and functions. He then defined distributions as linear functionals (denoted T ) that assigned a number to each infinitely differentiable function (denoted ') whose value was 0 outside of a bounded region. These criteria for ' obviated troublesome considerations about differentiability and boundary terms. When the distribution was a measure (denoted ) or a function (denoted f ), the number was determined by the definite integral of ' weighted by the function or measure-in Schwartz's symbolic notation,
Under the right conditions distributions could correspond to measures and measures in turn could correspond to functions, but each type of object included examples that lacked counterparts of the less general type.
As contemporaries recognized, this sequence of generalizations rhymed with the history of number concepts. 31 Corresponding to functions and derivatives, earlier scholars grappled with numbers and the operations of arithmetic and algebra. Counting numbers (0, 1, 2, 3, . . . ) were unproblematic under addition, but subtraction required generalizing to all integers, including oncecontroversial negative numbers. As with the generalization from functions to measures, when addition problems involved only counting numbers, everything worked as before, but arithmetic with negative numbers expanded what could be treated systematically and coherently. Integers accommodated addition, subtraction, and multiplication, but division called for fractions, or rational numbers. Finally, mathematicians allowed a complete and systematic framework including the extraction of square roots by admitting imaginary and complex numbers. Here, the chain of generalizations came to a close: complex numbers did the job not just for square roots but for any algebraic operations. Mathematicians learned to see this as evidence that the complex numbers were a natural culmination of numerical generalizations, but this did not stop efforts to find and advocate for yet further fruitful generalizations, such as quaternions or continua that included infinitesimals.
Starting with the Heaviside function, successive derivatives required successive generalizations to accommodate them. Then, as with the algebraic culmination in complex numbers, the generalizations miraculously stopped at linear functionals: every distribution had a derivative that was also a distribution, and was itself the derivative of a distribution. Just as no operation of algebra would ever need more than the complex numbers, no operation of the calculus (at least as construed here) would require more than distributions. But what exactly did ''differentiation'' mean when a distribution could not be interpreted as an ordinary function? Here, Schwartz followed his justificationthrough-generalization in reverse. Any operation applied to a distribution that happened to correspond to a function had to give the same result as the corresponding conventional operation from integral and differential calculus. Thus, the distributional derivative of a differentiable function was to match its conventional derivative. Schwartz then defined operations for arbitrary distributions (which did not, in general, have conventional derivatives) by translating a usual calculus presentation into one intelligible for linear functionals and then declaring that to be the general definition for distributions.
This reasoning rested on a combination of formal and informal wordplay. Arbitrary distributions were like functions, Schwartz implied, so operations with the one should look and feel like those with the other, using similar formalisms and terminology while calling upon similar intuitions. To define differentiation, Schwartz began with a conventionally differentiable function f in n variables and its derivative in the direction of the ith independent variable x i (denoted with an apostrophe and a subscript variable). As a linear functional, this gave the expression:
ðx 1 ; ::: ; x n Þ'ðx 1 ; ::: ; x n Þ dx 1 ::: dx n Then, Schwartz asserted, ''there is no difficulty to integrate by parts,'' applying a routine technique from the conventional calculus to rewrite the expression as:
Z f ðx 1 ; ::: ; x n Þ' 0 x i ðx 1 ; ::: ; x n Þ dx 1 ::: dx n or, in the idiom of linear functionals, f
The subtle but important difference between the two integral expressions involved removing the derivative from the function f and, along with introducing a minus sign, applying the derivative instead to the function '. Rendered in the compact formalism of linear functionals, stripped of the visual trappings and technical provisos of integration, the transformation was striking. Schwartz used this formal sleight-of-hand to define the derivative of a distribution as T
. The left side of this equation had no prior definition-the whole point of the endeavor was that T was not differentiable-but the right side appeared mathematically sound because the functions denoted ' were presumed differentiable and their derivatives continued to meet the requirements for the domain of the functionals T, so there was no new difficulty for T to act on those derivatives.
Integration by parts began, on the fifth page of Schwartz's article, as a familiar computational technique for evaluating integrals of conventionally differentiable functions. By characterizing that technique instead as an operation in the abstract calculus of functionals, within half a page he could declare that integration by parts ''permits the generalization of the notion of a derivative,'' and so he could correspondingly apply the formal operation of integration by parts to distributions for which a conventional calculus interpretation was impossible. 33 To accomplish this, Schwartz elided the significant conceptual distinctions between the superficially similar equations for functions and distributions, justifying the latter equation by portraying it as the same as the former. He defined distributional derivatives by turning integration by parts from a technique into a metaphor. This only worked by stripping both expressions of their mathematical justifications and conditions of validity, and interpreting them instead through their formal appearances-a symbolic pun, wordplay.
Such a pivotal use of what amounted to wordplay was plain to Schwartz's contemporaries. After Schwartz shared his theory late in 1947 with Marcel Riesz in Lund, Sweden, the latter (in Schwartz's telling) counseled him ''to 32. Note that here the integral is implicitly over the entire domain of the function, with the vanishing conditions on ' allowing Schwartz to omit boundary terms without comment. watch out for what is nothing but . . . wordplay [jeu de mots],'' as the ''very beautiful theory'' still ''wants for the effort of becoming deepened over the years.'' 34 Riesz recognized wordplay as both a resource and a danger, offering a beautiful formulation with considerable potential, provided one committed to the extended labor of realizing the theoretical depths that wordplay itself could only suggest. As the ensuing account shows, Schwartz both heeded and skirted this advice, relying at times on his wordplay-mediated ability to promote the theory superficially and even to argue that its essence was reflected in these superficial expositions. Indeed, Schwartz debuted his theory at a time when wordplay seemed itself more and more central to the fundaments of mathematical investigation.
MAKING SENSES OF DISTRIBUTIONS
Schwartz's formal prestidigitation represented an approach to mathematical argument increasingly visible in the twentieth century, one evident in a dual meaning of the word ''sense'' (sens in French) in Schwartz's 1945 article. The first meaning came in references to ''the usual sense'' of terms, indicating a way of understanding and using a term that might elsewhere be understood and used differently. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, a significant minority of mathematicians and philosophers had devoted special attention to the relationships between mathematics and the linguistic means and metamathematical frameworks by and through which it was articulated. 35 Though most mathematicians did not share the full measure of that minority's linguistic and philosophical preoccupations, they nevertheless increasingly specified precise interpretive contexts (or ''senses'') for mathematical terms as a routine feature of their expositions. Such specifications allowed mathematicians to recycle terms deliberately, taking rhetorical advantage of the terms' other meanings while stressing the technical differences of their new proposed uses.
By renaming the context of derivatives while keeping the same terminology for the operation of differentiation, Schwartz signaled that the essence of differentiation would be unchanged. Conversely, by replacing ''functions'' with the new term ''distributions,'' he suggested a more substantive conceptual break-one not wholly embraced by the many who later translated distributions as ''generalized functions.'' The term ''distributions'' was itself borrowed from probability, physics, and measure theory, and Schwartz's distributions shared many conceptual and practical features with distributions in these other settings. To emphasize Schwartz's particular context for ''distributions,'' especially in situations where other formulations of distributions might apply, mathematicians came to refer to ''Schwartz distributions'' or ''distributions in the sense of Laurent Schwartz.'' Schwartz's second usage of ''sense'' in the 1945 paper came from claims that statements ''have a sense'' or ''make sense'' (a/ont un sens), or conversely that they did not make sense. A formulation had a sense if it was completely justifiable, if not necessarily completely justified in the work at hand. For example, Schwartz asserted that ''here, [derivatives] @A/@y and @B/@x always have a sense qua distributions.'' This emphatic usage of sense was more particular to those writing about mathematical foundations, for whom it stressed the presence or absence of a coherent basis for an expression that might otherwise be assumed valid simply by virtue of its use in a mathematical argument.
The ambition to guarantee that every mathematical notion had a sense was a key pillar of the Bourbaki collaboration's central project, a series of textbooks titled Elements of Mathematic (singular). 36 The introduction to the first volume stipulated that the group's texts were to be ''formalized,'' meaning that they could in principle be expressed in a simple language with ''a syntax consisting of a small number of unbreakable rules'' that guaranteed the sensibility of every term. However, for the Bourbaki collaborators as for other mathematicians, ''having a sense'' was almost invariably a promissory claim rather than a meticulously demonstrated conclusion. Instead, Bourbaki explained, ''In general [the mathematician] is content to bring the exposition to a point where his experience and mathematical flair tell him that translation into formal language would be no more than an exercise of patience (though doubtless a very tedious one).'' 37 In place of tedious formalities, Bourbaki permitted ''abuses of language'' in order to make texts legible by assuming terms and claims to be sensible without rigorously justifying them on the spot.
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Bourbaki did not, of course, have a monopoly on either ''sensibility'' or mathematical foundations. After Bourbaki collaborator Jean Dieudonné laid out the Bourbaki philosophy of axiomatic mathematical method at a 1949 Colloquium of Mathematical Philosophy at the Sorbonne, in Paris, the colloquium secretary and Sorbonne professor Arnaud Denjoy replied with a lengthy denunciation in the colloquium proceedings.
39 Dieudonné, for his part, asserted that ''[t]he axiomatic method is tightly linked to the nature of deductive reasoning itself'' and recognized a historical ebb and flow of axiomatic reasoning with ''periods of expansion'' giving rise to controversy-filled ''periods of clearing [défrichement] . . . to restore the edifice to order.'' 40 Creativity and rigor lay in tension, but at the same time ''the axiomatic is perfectly compatible with a certain sort of intuition'' and mathematicians' insistence on ''sensible experience'' ''rested on a psychological illusion'' about the underlying source of their convictions. 41 For Dieudonné, axiomatic methods represented a means to support and clarify creative mathematics, not a stricture to rule out play and inspiration.
Denjoy, by contrast, saw in Dieudonné's regard for axioms and logic a ''fierce repudiation of every regard for testimony of sensible origin. '' 42 Noting that ''[a] French mathematical school already enjoys universal notoriety, assembling itself under the emblems and pennants of a mythical chief, Nicolas The two core preoccupations reflected in Schwartz's double meaning of ''sense''-definition (the sense of a term) and existence (having a sense)-must for Denjoy be subordinated to the only sense that mattered, ''the source of original intuitions'': one's sense of ''a world composed of experiences borrowed from the concrete.'' 44 Denjoy elaborated this into a specific claim about the source of sense and significance in mathematical symbols: ''Symbols, their associations ordered after set rules, do not come into possession of their signified sense except in relation to a mind capable of grasping them. . . . the abstract must always be clarified by the concrete. '' 45 Other critics saw in Bourbaki's approach to language little more than a coy evasion. Paul Halmos, introducing the collaboration to readers of Scientific American, averred that Bourbaki's insistence on calling out ''abuses of language'' showed Bourbaki's ''slightly contemptuous'' view of conventional terminology while preserving the collaborators' ability to use those same familiar terms. 46 But for Bourbaki this was precisely the point: mathematicians should not eschew conventional terms but must always pay attention to the sense (in Schwartz's first usage) in which they made sense (in Schwartz's second usage). Bourbaki's collaborators reveled in puns and parodies, and their intense, jocular meetings demanded virtuosic displays of interpretive versatility across fields of mathematics and their corresponding nuances of language.
47 Their rejection of naïve or unconsidered usages was as much a social and cultural norm as an intellectual and philosophical one-a social and cultural norm, it should be said, that could be deliberately exclusive and mocking, even cruel, to outsiders. When Schwartz, borrowing Bourbaki's turn of phrase, referred to the Dirac function in his 1945 introduction as an ''abuse of language,'' he was not condemning it but rather calling attention to its need for a sense-a sense given to it at long last by distributions. Giving something such a sense could itself be a sort of abuse of language, an invocation promising a justification whose validity rested more on habit and experience than a tedious exercise of patience. A full explication of what a term or expression meant as a statement about distributions could be onerous, and was rarely necessary in order to make a credible claim to sensibility. With practice, distributions' users found it easy to manipulate terms subject to the premises and implications of Schwartz's theory by, for instance, deploying integration by parts metaphorically, and they could confidently recognize when and how it was appropriate to do so. To those not versed in the theory's substantial theoretical underpinnings, results sometimes seemed to come more from wordplay than from rigorous mastery.
SENSE AND NONSENSE
The changing place of sense in modern mathematics found voice not only in mathematical theory but in mathematical farce. In 1937, Ralph P. Boas and some Princeton companions started a dinner table game of devising mathematical methods for catching lions. 48 Their 1938 article in the American Mathematical Monthly, published under a pseudonym (H. Pétard) in homage to Bourbaki, sparked a vigorous genre of self-parody among mathematicians. 49 It featured methods such as: THE METHOD OF INVERSIVE GEOMETRY. We place a spherical cage in the desert, enter it, and lock it. We perform an inversion with respect to the cage. The lion is then in the interior of the cage, and we are outside. Anything in the desert is a lion, but in the sense of distributions. For example, a stone is a lion in the sense of distributions. So it suffices to regularize it by a C 1 function with compact support, and it becomes a real lion, which furthermore is infinitely differentiable! 51 Distributions offered mathematicians a sense in which every function was differentiable, just one step removed from its conventional interpretation. A ritual incantation of regularization by a smooth compact function completed the trick, yielding a genuine function whose difficulties of differentiation had been swept away in the calculus of distributions. Applied to lions rather than functions, a magical-seeming intervention became sheer nonsense.
Schwartz's 1997 account of ''A lion in the sense of distributions'' had enough obvious misrecollections that I had included it in this essay just as an apocryphal illustration, true in spirit if not verifiably in fact. Then, while in the archives pursuing a different project, I came across a 1951 letter that confirms the story and its implications better than I could have imagined. In it, Boas reported that he was ''collecting new methods of lion hunting with a view to bring Pétard's minorem opus up to date,'' and suggested ''the office of Navel Research''-parodying the Office of Naval Research that emerged after World War II as a leading funder of American mathematical research and publication-may have sponsored the new project. Tucked between a method referring to Schwartz's fellow 1950 Fields Medalist Atle Selberg and a method deploying ''a high speed computer,'' one finds:
Boas signed the letter ''Yours in a cage. '' 52 Here, functions are replaced by lions and differentiating the former becomes catching the latter. Schwartz's theory let one differentiate any function, but the outcome was only guaranteed in general to be a distribution, equivalent to a function only if the original 51. MGC, 247. C 1 functions were those that were guaranteed to have no irregularities, and so always had conventionally valid differential equations. These included the auxiliary functions ' used to define distributions. function were differentiable. An abuse of language (whose Bourbaki connotations Boas signaled by leaving the phrase in French), however, let one carry on as though nothing was amiss. If a distribution could be regarded par abus de langage as a function, it could just as well be a lion! ''Lion Hunting'' was an effective parody because this kind of ''abuse of language'' could be found in virtually any kind of recent mathematics. Schwartz promoted his theory in a context where mathematicians plied familiar and novel formulations in ways that made sense only when accorded a proper interpretive framework, and where it was not just common but often necessary for mathematicians to move between senses of a term in their arguments. The parody lampooned a modern mathematics that appeared to many like an exercise in making sense from licensed puns.
MULTIPLYING AUDIENCES
The slippage licensed by Schwartz's language of senses appeared to some to be particularly pronounced among physicists. An early student of Schwartz's recounted that ''a good many limited their knowledge of the theory of distributions to the ritual phrase 'according to Schwartz, it has a sense.''' 53 Schwartz himself did little to discourage this attitude, and relished the spotlight that came with his designation as physicists' redeemer. Even those who might have wished for a detailed technical justification rather than the personal guarantee of the charismatic French theorist would have found it hard to come by, especially through the written literature: before his 1950-1951 textbook, the bulk of the theory's formal development remained a promissory note alone. In the interim, Schwartz cultivated an image of a theory that offered an easy rectification to the problems of differentiation.
This image took the fore in his first major public lecture explicitly aimed at non-mathematicians, on December 4, 1946, at the Society of Radioelectricians, subsequently published in the Annales des Télécommunications. Integral calculus was an effectively universal element of undergraduate science and engineering curricula in this period, and integration by parts was a core part of mathematicians' stock-in-trade. 55 Although the telecommunications audience would surely have been familiar with integration by parts, Schwartz did not assume its use and teaching to be so central to their routine practice, and so the metaphor took a back seat. Rather, Schwartz stressed how distributions allowed ''the complete justification of certain processes'' where ''one boldly uses the 'Dirac function''' and asserted that ''the systematic manipulation of distributions permits evaluation with greater ease and fewer chances to commit errors.'' Despite its ''complicated appearance,'' he proposed, his framework ''is in reality very simple and demands just a little mathematical knowledge.'' Claiming his theory's simplicity, Schwartz walled off the often-difficult recent developments in the theory of functions and topological vector spaces that (at least in principle) underwrote his distributions' prized rigorous foundation. Instead, he emphasized distributions as tools for a conventionally acceptable and ultimately simple technical method learnable by rote and sight-precisely the kind of method his audience already had in the Dirac and Heaviside calculi. Simple could also mean superfluous, and for many it was enough just to know that the theory of distributions justified what they were already doing. This early presentation would prove more important for Schwartz himself, helping him hone a view of his theory as simple, fundamental, and meaningful for non-mathematicians, whether or not nonmathematicians themselves endorsed the sentiment. As a result of the developments described up to this point, Schwartz was positioned both intellectually and institutionally for an international launch under the new terms of postwar international science and mathematics, associated here especially with Rockefeller philanthropy. Directed by Warren Weaver, the Foundation's Division of Natural Sciences partnered with the CNRS to conduct international colloquia centered around specific topics of contemporary research. Weaver intended to maximize informal interaction and scientific contacts and to spread the benefits of foreign visitors and research investment to provincial universities so as to reorganize French science on an American model of regional, national, and international competition. Such imposed decentralization significantly accelerated Schwartz and his theory's international recognition, as the French mathematician was still years away from a firm foothold in the elite institutions of Paris that could otherwise afford him such a profile.
One of an initial pair of Rockefeller-CNRS colloquia in mathematics was a meeting on Harmonic Analysis in June 1947 at the Faculty of Sciences of Nancy, where Schwartz had been appointed in 1945. The meeting's roster featured researchers at a range of career stages from Nancy, Paris, the United States, Scandinavia, Switzerland, and Britain. As a local junior colleague to the colloquium's primary hosts, Schwartz assisted with organizational correspondence and was able to give a presentation of his own and to circulate his ''propaganda tract'' on distributions among the materials shared with participants in advance of the meeting. 58 Danish delegates Harald Bohr (the younger brother of physicist Niels, and a mathematician of considerable international stature) and his protégé Børge Jessen were so impressed with Schwartz's performance that they invited him to lecture in Copenhagen the following October.
59 To Schwartz's ''agreeable surprise,'' in preparation for the October visit Bohr had made a personal study of Schwartz's 1945 paper and turned it into a course at his university. technical and conceptual considerations one would expect at such a specialist gathering, for his Copenhagen audience Bohr urged Schwartz to reemphasize the theory's potential as a bridge between pure and applied mathematics, in part in response to the institutional conditions of his Danish visit to both the university and polytechnical school. This framing-of a pure theory that redeemed and even improved technical practice-became central for Bohr. Fully in the thrall of Schwartz's visit, the Danish mathematical elder statesman committed to travel to North America early in the following year to lecture on topics including ''the generalization of the notion of differentiability of Laurent Schwartz.'' 61 Bohr's lectures on Schwartz's theory, in Copenhagen and then New York and several other key North American sites, were likely the first such expositions outside of France and Western Europe, respectively. Indeed, I have argued in detail elsewhere that Bohr helped precipitate nearly every one of Schwartz's most important international milestones between 1947 and 1950, sometimes in ways opaque to Schwartz himself. 62 An early hint of Schwartz's formulation, however, had already in 1947 reached most American sites of mathematical research (and many beyond the United States) through a brief entry on Schwartz's 1945 article in Mathematical Reviews. Then less than a decade old, the review journal had been created by the American Mathematical Society with the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Corporation in response to the nazification of the pioneering German review journal, Zentralblatt für Mathematik.
63 A short, ambivalent review of Schwartz's article signaled that he had proposed new definitions for ''functions'' and ''derivatives'' in order to justify the Dirac function and its derivatives, but the reviewer did not mention the term ''distributions.'' It would take another two years for the CNRS to publish the proceedings of the Nancy colloquium.
65 However Schwartz published a revised and somewhat elaborated version of his contribution, aimed at specialists in mathematical analysis, in the Annales de l'université de Grenoble later in 1947.
66 The same year the CNRS proceedings appeared, the 1947 article was reviewed in both Mathematical Reviews and the Zentralblatt für Mathematik, the latter of which had been revived in Berlin in 1947, with operations in both Western and Soviet zones. For Mathematical Reviews, Irving Segal of the University of Chicago briefly noted Schwartz's new definitions and some of their claimed applications. 67 For the Zentralblatt, meanwhile, Freiburg mathematician Gustav Doetsch offered an exceptionally long and detailed review (running to some two-and-a-half pages of small print) praising both Schwartz's 1947 and 1945 papers as offering a ''new way'' that made difficulties surrounding the Dirac function, for instance, ''disappear completely. '' 68 Doetsch, who directed wartime mathematical research from his post in the German Aviation Ministry, was at the time he reviewed Schwartz's article still suspended from the University of Freiburg under the institution's denazification regime. 69 Though the documentary record on Doetsch's Nazism is unclear, there was no doubt of his zeal for mathematical applications, and he became one of Schwartz's most ardent early non-francophone promoters. His reviews gave yet another layer of meaning to Schwartz's postwar project of sense-giving, one that must have been especially significant for an expurgated scholar in occupied Germany: according to Doetsch, distributions ''gave citizenship'' to the Dirac function and other deracinated denizens of a mathematics in need of new foundations. 
A CONSIDERABLE SIMPLIFICATION
On the strength of Bohr's endorsement, Schwartz was among four foreign mathematicians invited to headline the second quadrennial meeting of the Canadian Mathematical Congress in Vancouver and its associated summer seminar in 1949. 70 Here, the Dirac function's redeemer met its most famous user, English mathematical physicist Paul Dirac himself, who found Schwartz's lectures at least sufficiently engaging to remain awake for their duration. 71 In addition to Schwartz and Dirac, Polish mathematician Antoni Zygmund of the University of Chicago and Indian mathematical physicist Homi J. Bhabha of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research rounded out the meeting's ''Lecture Series on Research Topics.'' 72 Schwartz's eight summer seminar lectures closely followed his 1948 Annales des Télécommunications article, an English translation of which was appended to the typed notes distributed to participants. 73 His lecture notes took the article's claims about the theory's ease to an even greater extreme: distributions were now suited ''for young students and engineers,'' a ''considerable simplification, without requiring great mathematical insight.'' 74 Indeed, borrowing another Bourbaki phrase, Schwartz went so far as to assert that ''it is possible to start the theory from zero. '' 75 This latter version of Schwartz's theory, one emphasizing its metaphors and the formal manipulations they licensed, took center stage the following year on Schwartz's second trans-Atlantic voyage, to Cambridge, Massachusetts. At the opening ceremony of the 1950 International Congress of Mathematicians, he was one of two mathematicians to be presented with a Fields Medal by the selection committee's chair, Harald Bohr. 76 Though Bohr lauded the ''sensational character'' of the work of the first medalist, Atle Selberg, it would have been clear to those assembled that the balance of Bohr's enthusiasm lay with Schwartz and his theory of distributions. Indeed, I have elsewhere analyzed new archival evidence that makes clear that Bohr's enthusiasm for the mathematician and his theory led him to manipulate the Fields Medal selection itself to ensure that Schwartz would be a recipient. 77 In a presentation double the length devoted to Selberg, Bohr attested to his ''considerable amount of pleasant excitement, on seeing the wonderful harmony of the whole structure of the calculus to which the theory leads and on understanding how essential an advance its application may mean to many parts of higher analysis. '' 78 By 1950, Bohr was a comparatively seasoned evangelist for the theory of distributions. With a tradesman's polish and a convert's zeal, he depicted a theory fit for the exertions of young researchers, offering precepts that ''may find their place even in the more elementary courses of the calculus in universities and technical schools.'' For many in his audience, this was the first glimpse of the theory of distributions. The theory took hold after 1950 in part because, for many, a single glimpse was enough. Its most striking claims were ''so easy to explain,'' professed Bohr, that he ''cannot resist the temptation, notwithstanding the general solemn nature of this opening meeting, to go into some detail.'' Hewing closely to Schwartz's 1945 article, from which he had derived his Copenhagen course, Bohr began with the Dirac function and its derivatives and the series of generalizations that would tame them, culminating with linear functionals. He then followed Schwartz's presentation of differentiation by way of integration by parts for functions of one variable, stressing the formal similarities that allowed derivatives to be defined for all distributions. Bohr's irresistible details, however, remained at a level of simple formal manipulations, framings, and comparisons, free from most of the technical scaffolding and theoretical apparatus of mathematical analysis from which they were derived.
In his brief time at the podium, Bohr demonstrated that a meaningful appreciation of Schwartz's theory did not require anything approaching a technical mastery of the theory or its contexts in modern analysis. Bohr's irresistible details were, to be sure, closely tied to the proofs, structures, problems, and practices of those who had made distributions an object of sustained study, and for whom such details guided intuitions and shaped narratives and explanations. But the theory's advanced research community, such as it was, depended on a significantly larger audience of those interested in the theory at different levels and for different purposes, some of whom would become experts but most of whom would not. This large group of mathematicians newly familiar with distributions would supply, in the coming years, the theory's enthusiastic researchers, their supportive colleagues, seminar audiences, and prize committees. Without proofs and with very few formal statements, Bohr made Schwartz's theory available to its largest audience yet. It was metaphors and comparisons, not formal proofs and structures nor problems and practices, that constituted the theory for this group, at least at first. The research community for the theory of distributions, importantly, did not include Bohr himself. Although Bohr worked in areas of analysis related to those to which distributions were pertinent before his death in January 1951, he has not typically been cited as a contributor to the theory itself. Because he lacked an identifiable research result about distributions, historians and mathematicians have almost entirely neglected his crucial contribution to the theory's meteoric early adoption-arguably his last major intervention on the stage of international mathematics. However, that same lack was perhaps what made his ultimate contribution possible. Bohr had enough expertise to grasp and articulate the theory's significance, but without the messy experience from first-hand research of having to grapple with its intricate difficulties and ambiguities. 79 At a slight remove from the theory's sometimes dense technicalities and unresolved tensions, he was an ideal ambassador.
A TRAVELING THEORY
The intercontinental fallout of Bohr's evangelism was swift and far-reaching. By the summer of 1950, the Paris publisher Hermann had released the first volume of Schwartz's inexpensively printed textbook on the theory of distributions, and the second followed in 1951.
80 Spurred by Bohr's advertisement, the textbook became a fixture of mathematics libraries and an obligatory citation for those adapting or applying Schwartz's theory. As they had for Schwartz's 1947 paper, Segal and Doetsch reviewed the volumes in, respectively, Mathematical Reviews and the Zentralblatt für Mathematik, ensuring a broad general awareness of the textbook in its relevant specialist communities. 81 These review journals also began, with increasing frequency after 1950, to signal researchers' burgeoning interest in distributions with reviews of new publications. These reviews, typically written in English or French by Schwartz's sympathizers (and sometimes by Schwartz himself), routinely referred to Schwartz's textbook and terminology, even if the work under review was not framed as a contribution to Schwartz's theory by its own author. 82 The limited format of a review article proved an ideal mechanism for annexing and consolidating such wide-ranging works, with just enough space to signal broad uniting claims without presenting the details wherein lay the most significant differences and departures. To note a novel development in such a review often amounted to identifying a key term and connecting it to other terminological (often eponymic) touchstones of the field-a word-focused exercise in asserting the sense of the intervention. This lent the theory of distributions a selfreinforcing appearance of coherence and broad interest. Annual direct citations of Schwartz's textbook peaked in Mathematical Reviews at 15 (in 1955), and together its volumes were invoked in 52 separate Mathematical Reviews entries between 1951 and 1958.
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While Schwartz's textbook served for most mathematicians (including those who did not work primarily in French) as the definitive reference on the 80. Laurent Schwartz, Théorie des Distributions, vol. 1 (Paris: Hermann, 1950). The work was published as part of two series that were often cited alongside or in place of the publisher: most commonly, the Actualités Scientifiques et Industrielles (no. 1091), and less commonly, the Publications de l'Institut de Mathématique de l'Université de Strasbourg (no. IX). The second volume, which contained the bibliography for both, was published by Hermann in 1951, and was no. 1122 in the Actualités series and no. X in the Strasbourg series.
81. Mathematical Reviews accessed via MathSciNet, MR0035918 (vol. 1) and MR0041345 (vol. 2). Zentralblatt reviews from zbmath.org, Zbl 30.12601, 37.07301, 42.11405.
82. E.g., MR0036949 (12,189d), MR0036950 (12,190a), MR0070969 (17,63c), MR0070970 (17,63d), MR0072937 (17,354c), MR0072938 (17,354d), MR0074491 (17,594e) accessed on MathSciNet.
83. Citation figures are from MathSciNet. See also PLS, §2.3. Mathematical Reviews represents, of course, just a fraction of the textbook's citations across all publications in those years, during which the textbook was a more or less obligatory citation for works explicitly engaging Schwartz's theory.
foundations of the theory of distributions, a range of introductory texts by others made the theory recognizable in a much broader range of settings, languages, and disciplinary idioms than would have been possible with Schwartz's writings alone. Geographically, these texts appeared in nearly every region with a significant mathematical publishing infrastructure, from South America to South Asia to the Soviet Union. Some authors aimed primarily to draw attention to Schwartz's own work. 84 Others, however, presumed that Schwartz's theory was in need of domestication or reframing for their particular audiences, particularly if that audience included physicists.
Canadian mathematician Israel Halperin, for instance, adapted Schwartz's Vancouver lectures into a short pamphlet aimed at mathematical physicists. 85 Halperin's pamphlet began with the Heaviside and Dirac functions and asserted that distributions gave ''rigorous content and validity to the formulae of operational calculus'' associated with those two figures and their functions. 86 U.S.-based Dutch mathematician Jacob Korevaar produced a series of articles ''from the point of view of applied mathematics,'' also beginning with Dirac and Heaviside and their symbolic manipulation and claiming that Schwartz's distributions gave ''a mathematical basis for these formulas and for the use of other improper functions.'' 87 Argentine mathematician Alberto González Domínguez, who likely first learned of the theory from Bohr's presentation at the 1950 International Congress, offered his own account just over a year later in Uruguay of distributions as a rigorous means of deriving formulas from quantum physics otherwise obtained symbolically-that is, of distributions as licensed wordplay. 88 Mathematical physicists themselves increasingly heeded Schwartz's early suggestions of distributions' relevance to their research, and in so doing found a theory in need of considerably more reformulation and adaptation than Schwartz had implied. 89 Even pure mathematicians found many features of Schwartz's presentations wanting. Polish mathematician Jan Mikusiński advanced an operator-theoretic interpretation of the theory that stressed the notion of weak convergence, beginning with a series of articles in French from 1948 to 1950 and culminating with a 1957 textbook on the subject, with distributions exemplifying a more general phenomenon with wider potential applications than was evident from Schwartz's focus on mathematical physics and differential equations. 90 Schwartz, reviewing Mikusiński's work in English in Mathematical Reviews, explicitly compared the latter's approach to his 1945 exposition, and so claimed it for the theory of distributions. 91 Note the inversion: Mikusiński considered Schwartz's theory a narrow application of his own, and Schwartz likewise presented Mikusiński's theory as a specialized contribution to the theory of distributions. They sparred, in other words, over the sense of their respective theories.
While Mikusiński became a particularly widely cited authority in Central and Eastern Europe, renderings like Schwartz's in compact sense-driven settings like Mathematical Reviews helped ensure that a great share of the Polish mathematician's citations in the West took his theory as Schwartz did. Oxford mathematician George Temple, for instance, claimed to have derived his ''alternative and simplified exposition'' of Schwartz's ''highly abstract'' theory of distributions from Mikusiński's, which he depicted as a means of domesticating distributions for ''the physicist and engineer'' by emphasizing mathematical techniques of approximation and convergence. 92 In contrast to the instrumental framing with which Mikusiński's theory's crossed from East to West, Soviet mathematicians Israel Gelfand and Georgeii Shilov's monumental five-volume 1958 work Generalized Functions travelled largely intact (albeit much more slowly) with the help of systematic cover-to-cover translation programs that brought Russian works to English, French, and German audiences. 93 Here, the cultural and intellectual authority granted to both the Soviet authors and their institutional context helped them benefit from systematic efforts to comprehend foreign theories on their own terms. At the same time, linguistic decisions in the translations, especially those concerning fundamental terminology, inevitably favored some senses and interpretations of the Soviet work over others.
Many important expository and programmatic works emerged from a proliferation of seminars and courses that mathematicians organized to teach and investigate the theory in its several guises. Postwar Paris witnessed an efflorescence of research seminars devoted to framing the latest developments of international mathematics through the concepts and styles of the seminars' participants. 94 In addition to his vigorous participation in such seminars, Schwartz offered a heavily subscribed series of lectures in mathematical physics and other topics after moving to Paris from Nancy in 1953, and these were frequently an occasion to print inexpensive collections of lecture notes from Schwartz or his students. 95 These lectures helped secure Schwartz's reputation in France as a leading contributor to applied mathematics, despite his association with a Bourbaki program often seen as indifferent or hostile to applications. 96 Where Schwartz himself was not present, lecturers made more deliberate use of his textbook and their own contacts among researchers on distributions. 97 In the United States, Britain, and France, such courses prepared advanced undergraduates for further work in mathematics or mathematical physics by introducing a theory at once easily appreciated in its rudiments and notably on the discipline's cutting edge.
The same apparent features that made the theory of distributions an appealing subject for an advanced undergraduate course made it all the more promising as a topic of special lectures from visiting mathematicians. The former Trotskyist and continuing political activist Schwartz, along with his American supporters, made a series of tactical mistakes during his 1949 application to visit the United States that nearly prevented him from coming in 1950 to accept his Fields Medal. The highly visible debacle left significant uncertainty over his subsequent prospects for lecturing in the United States. 98 Mathematicians at farther-flung institutions, many of whom were present at the 1950 International Congress of Mathematicians to hear Bohr's presentation, capitalized on this situation to bring Schwartz to their own shores. They were helped in their efforts by support from U.S. mathematicians and funding sources, as well as increasingly available scholarly travel funding from international bodies like the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
Where 99 In India, Colombia, and Argentina, his host institution arranged for lecture notes to be edited and published, and such notes circulated widely in both the centers and peripheries of elite mathematics. 100 These international contacts helped Schwartz and his supporters to establish a cohort of younger researchers reaching from France to Northern Europe, the United States, Brazil, and Argentina.
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To the extent scholars of distributions the world over formed and sustained a coherent research community, they did so through the means and media that brought Schwartz early recognition. Conferences and colloquia allowed them to couch new developments in familiar terms, often by letting recognizable symbolic manipulations stand in for an unwieldy mass of detailed research. New textbooks and expository works plied metaphors from local disciplinary idioms to domesticate an initially radical theory. Decorated experts followed the paths of Bohr and Schwartz, promoting and studying distributions in foreign lands. Most kept abreast of new work in the area through abstracting journals and related means of abbreviated communication. If mathematical research hinged on protracted engagement with fine points of difficult concepts, mathematical research communities were sustained principally with what could be shared quickly and recognizably, and could be readily assigned a sense-making sense. Despite genuine differences among theorists in Poland, France, Britain, the Americas, and beyond, the theory of distributions attained an intercontinental reach by accommodating the kinds of partially shared legibilities that let each make sense of each other in their respective terms.
METAPHORS AND LIVED INCOHERENCE
International research communities, much less intercontinental ones, do not arise spontaneously. They require interconnected but geographically dispersed groups of individuals to decide to study the same topic, secure the means to do so, communicate their findings to each other, and recognize their work as part of a coherent body of scholarship. For the community that coalesced in the early postwar period around the theory of distributions, mathematicians met each of these requirements through means where evocative metaphors and suggestive framings did far more to foster interest and an appearance of common enterprise than did the rigorous technical constructs commonly associated with modern mathematics. That those metaphors and framings drew their power in part by helping distributions' advocates to promise rigorous foundations was, here, not an irony or a contradiction but a reflection of the changing nature of mathematical theory and research. Detailed, meticulous work by committed investigators on the theory's finer points would be important, to be sure, but that was not the work that made the theory travel so far and so fast, across languages and continents, in the mid-twentieth century.
Integrating distributions into one's day-to-day mathematics required difficult learning and adaptation, but integrating them into one's worldview required little more than evocative metaphors like those of Schwartz's initial ''propaganda tract'' and Bohr's 1950 address-metaphors derived from quotidian practice but with a life of their own. These two promoted distributions by transferring the difficulty of mastering the theory to the lesser difficulty of appreciating it, of acting as though all one needed was a well-chosen rearrangement of symbols and a change in signs. Indeed, in this period this kind of wordplay-inflected appreciation was, in many settings, all one could hope for and all that was required. The rise of the theory of distributions bears witness to the outsized effect that short summaries in review journals, brief lectures by traveling scholars, and cursory conceptual introductions in regional publications could have for organizing researchers separated by distance, training, and idiom. These mediumdependent connections made it possible for the theory to move from the French provinces to multiple continents in less than a decade.
Mid-century contexts of communication fit some theories and mathematicians better than others, and ensured that the most communicable aspects of any given theory came to dominate how mathematicians understood and shared what they did. Distributions were distinctive in the extent to which the kinds of metaphors and wordplay that traveled so well in lectures and review journals were central features of the theory's earliest articulation. From Schwartz's first publication on the subject and reverberating through his and others' early expositions, the theory depended on deft reframings of familiar terms and operations like differentiation and integration by parts. As Schwartz, Bohr, and others rearticulated the theory of distributions in successive presentations in its early years, they emphasized and reemphasized the symbolic manipulations and claims (especially regarding the Dirac and Heaviside functions) that made the theory most recognizable, at the expense of the technical apparatus that they purported would guarantee the theory's rigor (and thus its merit as means of foundational rehabilitation). Distributions could thrive in part because such reframings had become, over the preceding half century, primary mechanisms of mathematical argument and exposition-ones based on the intermingling of Schwartz's two senses of ''sense'': having an (in principle) logical foundation and having a (working) context that promises such a foundation.
It was neither possible nor necessary that mathematical physicists in Manchester meant the same thing by generalized functions as operator theorists in Warsaw, function theorists in Chicago, or mathematical analysts in Rio de Janeiro. Distributions varied, in this period, not only along a spectrum from suggestive metaphors to detailed programs of research. Scholars' different articulations of the theory reflected the different frameworks and communities of the interlinked national and regional communities in which it was elaborated, debated, and pursued. In Brazil, Schwartz portrayed it as an ingredient in modernization-both of mathematics and of a nation. In France, the theory was strongly identified with its charismatic originator and (in many eyes) the abstract program of Bourbaki, allied with modernization of a different sort. In the United States, to which Schwartz could not travel with ease, the theory found a range of institutional homes and advocates. In England, Temple made it out to be a foreign theory whose utility and grace emerged only upon a suitable domestication. He understood the foundational significance of sequences and the topology of functions in a way that could appear radically different from, for instance, the understanding Mikusiński promulgated in Warsaw, but mutually recognizable formalisms, examples, and terminology let each develop his respective approach in his respective sense. Divergent interpretations of the theory let scholars in new places with varied interests find something in the theory of distributions worth pursuing, and those same scholars followed their lines of inquiry to very different ends, enrolling other people and ideas along the way. Communities of distribution theorists and their respective interpretations of the theory came together, to the extent that they did, through plentiful but circumscribed opportunities to travel and through the circulation of publications and reviews. But most of all, they came together through metaphors. Though the theory took many forms in many places in its first decade, its users could deploy common analogies and images to convince themselves that they were studying the same thing, and to effect meaningful exchanges amongst themselves. Their conviction of common ground necessarily came before the long and hard work of reconciling diverse ideas and institutions.
Such rhetorical features tied together a community of researchers that, though highly differentiated, was itself integrated by parts. Among the chief challenges to the historiography of twentieth-century mathematics has been the technically difficult work of assessing the relationships between different theoretical productions. The early history of distributions offers a reminder that such technical reconciliation was an ongoing and difficult task for historical mathematicians themselves-one in which, moreover, mathematicians needed not always be wholly successful to sustain significant programs of research. Rather than seeking coherence in historical theories, historians of modern mathematics can heed what was often the lived incoherence of those theories and the necessarily superficial but nonetheless important ways such theories cohered nonetheless. This article is for my parents, Barbara and George, who fostered from an early age my enthusiasm for both wordplay and mathematics, and for Masha Raskolnikov and Gregory Tomso, who showed me how to combine these enthusiasms in academic scholarship.
